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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to elaborate on the crucial effects that a seemingly detrimental policy
change in Spain has had on the international entrepreneurial activities of domestic renewable energy
(RE) firms.
Design/methodology/approach – Primary data were collected from nine RE companies in Spain
and then triangulated with secondary data and interviews from informants in other local
institutions.
Findings – Domestic RE firms, due to an institutional scape driver action, reacted to an increasingly
uncertain and generally more adverse renewable energy policy framework in this country by
preferring to internationalise towards foreign markets that had lower political uncertainty than the
domestic one.
Research limitations/implications – This paper complements previous research primarily on firm-
specific factors that enhance internationalising firms’ survival and growth through a focus on the impact of a
changing institutional-political environment at the home country-level.
Practical implications – Practitioners in the RE sector should analyse the risk of focusing only on the
homemarket, as it can be too dependent on uncontrolled variations in domestic energy policy.
Social implications – The findings indicate that a more stable and supportive, long-term perspective
in the domestic RE policy is essential for the sustained growth and development of this emerging
industry.
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Originality/value – To analyse the strategy by which a number of purposefully selected companies were
able to use international expansion as a survival-seeking strategy against a drastic policy-level change in the
domestic REmarket.
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1. Introduction
Policies and regulations, which are usually considered hard institutional factors, may play a
key role in the development of green, sustainable technologies. Indeed, results from previous
studies have shown that there is a tendency to emphasise the importance of an effective and
favourable policy scheme in fostering sustainable industries (De Laurentis and Cooke, 2008;
Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Lund, 2007). Within renewable energy (RE) industries in particular,
as the cost of electricity based on RE is still not at a level to compete with other more
conventional sources of energy, these newer technologies usually need to be supported by a
favourable domestic policy scheme, particularly when system imperfections are detected in
the marketplace (Negro et al., 2012). Therefore, development and growth in the global RE
industry is generally highly related to strong policy support, and public incentives seem to
be especially important. For instance, several studies in the marine energy sector have found
that firms that emerged with an international market outlook from their inception tended to
begin the early allocation of their activities in countries with highly supportive public
energy policies (Løvdal and Neumann, 2011; Løvdal andMoen, 2013; Bjørgum et al., 2013).
Furthermore, the RE sector is also highly influenced by relevant institutional agreements
at an international level, which then have to be locally implemented and reinforced.
However, many different countries have diverse capacities and institutional regulatory
systems (e.g. public policy) regarding RE investments (Gonzalez-Perez, 2016). Consequently,
they usually design and implement domestic energy policies according to their own
economic, legal and socio-political structure. This means that the RE sector is heavily
influenced by the actions of local stakeholders and policymakers’ in each country, thereby
stressing the importance of the influence that domestic regulatory institutions may have on
the global development of the RE sector. Therefore, different energy policies in different
contexts have actually resulted in highly different outcomes.
In the particular case of Spain, which is the focus of our country-specific research
contextualised in this study, a number of widely unexpected and increasingly unfavourable
regulatory changes have occurred at the national energy policy-level in recent years. These
changes, along with the fairly unpredictable domestic energy policy, have not only
weakened the initially promising domestic RE market in the country, but also have
ultimately forced many local companies to decide to enter foreign markets to look for a more
favourable energy policy regime abroad. For example, companies such as the Spanish
subsidiary Alstom-wind, which had started operations in the domestic wind power market,
have finally reacted to this change in domestic energy policy by joining new international
projects in other more favourable institutional contexts that promote growth for these
technologies, such as Japan.
In general, there is a paucity of research focussed on the RE business sector, especially
from a combination of international business, entrepreneurial and institutional perspectives
(Kolk, 2015). This study, thus, aims to fill this gap by critically investigating the impact of a
changing national RE policy in a highly developed country such as Spain. Indeed, the RE




this research. This is due to the varied and highly uncertain shifts that occur in the sector at
the policy-level over the time period studied. These changes ultimately generate reactive
cross-border movements among domestic green companies that are looking for better
opportunities and more stable institutional frameworks abroad, which are seen as a scape
path for their survival and eventual growth.
Our study makes several contributions in this research field. Firstly, from a theoretical
standpoint, our paper complements previous research primarily on firm-specific factors that
enhance the internationalising firms’ survival and growth (Autio et al., 2000; Sapienza et al.,
2006; Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; Carr et al., 2010; Meschi et al., 2017; Patel et al., 2018), such as
focussing on the impact of a changing institutional-political environment on a home country-
level, a factor that is largely out of firms’ control (Peng, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018).
Secondly, from a contextualising empirical perspective, our paper provides rich and unique
context-specific evidence of the highly unstable political environment that affects the RE
sector in Spain over the period studied, along with its key impact upon the sector’s
development in the country. As far as we know, despite the increased stream of research in
this area, there are no previous studies that have similarly investigated how largely uncertain
energy policy changes in the domestic RE sector can critically motivate local firms’ desire to
conduct international business (IB) activities. Overall, our results contribute to both the
sustainable and international business/entrepreneurship fields and could also have relevant
public policy implications by demonstrating how such a highly policy-sensitive (RE) industry
can be conducive in the decision to internationalise as a survival-seeking business strategy.
This paper is structured as follows: we first build an initial literature and conceptual
background regarding the internationalisation-firm survival relationship in general, and
expound on the impact of a key institutional factor – domestic policy – on business
internationalisation, particularly when it shows highly uncertain conditions in the home
country. This will then be followed by a description of different policy-level effects in the
context of the RE sector across several countries and, more particularly, of the generally
unstable and uncertain RE policy present in Spain during the past decade. Next, we explain our
research method to investigate how a selected number of local companies coped with the
increasingly unfavourable RE policy regime enacted within the country. Finally, we present
and discuss our key findings and endwith some concluding remarks and relevant implications.
2. Literature and conceptual background
2.1 Impact of home political uncertainty on internationalisation
Based upon very recent research regarding the phenomenon of emerging market
multinationals, such as the so-called “multilatinas” in Latin America (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016),
a relatively new trend in IB studies has sought to address the fundamental question of how a
firm’s home country (and not only the host ones) may influence its decision regarding
internationalisation (Garcia-Canal and Guillen, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018).
According to this approach, different dimensions of the environment of operation of a
firm within its own home country, such as the political, social, economic or geographic
dimensions (Ghemawat, 2001) usually result in either “learning drivers” (i.e. managers
learning from the conditions of the home country and using this learning abroad) or “scape
drivers” (i.e. managers taking their firms abroad to avoid the conditions of the home
country), which could ultimately be a motivation for the foreign expansion of domestic firms
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018).
During specific examinations of the institutional and/or politico-legal dimensions of a
given country, its level of political uncertainty has been found to be the key potential driver





2016; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). According to these authors, this influence can be twofold.
The first possible mechanism of influence is the (institutional) political uncertainty learning,
whereby managers develop the ability to deal with high political uncertainty or risks at
home (Holburn and Zelner, 2010) that can be useful abroad. This could lead to the decision to
enter similar countries that also have frequent and sudden changes in government policies
and/or become able to manage a high degree of political diversity across countries. The
second one is (institutional) political uncertainty escape, whereby managers decide to move
operations abroad to institutionally more stable countries with reduced political uncertainty,
which usually tend to be the most advanced world economies, to avoid the higher level of
uncertainty in the home country.
2.2 Impact of internationalisation on firm long-term survival
The strategic decision regarding if and if so, when to initiate the internationalisation process
is central to any firm’s long-term performance (Peng, 2001). However, in the IB and
international entrepreneurship (IE) literature, there appears to be two opposing approaches
with regard to the earliness and subsequent speed of internationalisation after venture
establishment in the domestic context, along with their consequences for firm survival and
eventual growth (Casillas andAcedo, 2013; Meschi et al., 2017).
The internationalisation process theory/Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977,
2009) or the so-called “gradualist approach”, clearly argues for a slow and incremental
internationalisation pattern due to both an increasing level of resource commitment by a
firm and the experiential market knowledge that is being gradually acquired in subsequent
foreign markets due to a gradually higher psychic distance from its home country. This
more traditional approach regarding firm internationalisation also suggests that a
significant time lag is required between the creation of a firm in its own domestic market
and its first foreign entry (which usually includes targeting a very psychologically close
country) to ensure it has secured all the necessary tangible and intangible resources needed
for internationalisation (Luo and Peng, 1999). Therefore, from this theoretical approach, a
relatively long period of domestic business activity prior to internationalisation is seen as
the most secure way, if not the only way, for firms to eventually succeed in initial entry into
the foreignmarket (Carr et al., 2010).
However, the more recent international new venture (INV) and/or IE theory (Oviatt and
McDougall, 1994; Madsen and Servais, 1997; Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) contrarily points
out that an increasing number of new/young small and medium-sized enterprises are
nowadays more capable than ever before of starting to expand abroad shortly after the
foundation is established at home. This is achieved by quickly and effectively developing
and leveraging key resources, capabilities, and networks abroad. Such INVs and/or born-
global firms are generally defined as entrepreneurial, internationally-oriented start-ups that
begin IB in foreign markets at inception or very shortly thereafter (Cavusgil and Knight,
2015; Coviello, 2015) and seem to be “ready out of the gate” to expand and leverage business
opportunities across borders (almost) from the outset (Patel et al., 2018). Compared to the
dominant psychic distance logic that guides the incremental foreign market selection of the
gradualist internationalisation process model of the firm, the IE approach suggests that,
regardless of the psychic or cultural distance from the home country, early and rapid
internationalisation, which is typical of INVs and/or born-globals, allows them to achieve
international and/or sometimes even global outreach quickly by operating in highly
specialised niche segments available in global markets that are often open to new




In the light of these two theoretical approaches that offer conflicting arguments
regarding the earliness and speed of internationalisation from a venture’s inception, several
authors consider that internationalisation that is too early may substantially increase the
costs, risks and challenges, especially in a new/young organisation such as an INV, when
compared to its more established and/or larger counterparts (Sapienza et al., 2006;
Sleuwaegen and Onkelinx, 2014). This is so because internationalising prematurely may
reveal the inadequacy of the key firm resources and capabilities. However, it could also be
argued that delaying the decision to internationalise for an unnecessarily long period may
also entail huge opportunity costs for a firm (Patel et al., 2018), particularly when increased
foreign competition and/or more uncertain market conditions appear to be present in a
firm’s home country. This would also, therefore, threaten its future business performance
and survival prospects (Chetty et al., 2014). Accordingly, it could be argued that both
extremes, either being too early or too late with internationalisation from venture inception,
are likely lead to a higher risk of firm failure compared to identifying an optimal time to
internationalise the given firm.
3. Policy-level effects in renewable energy development across countries
Institutional and entrepreneurship literature usually considers policy as a formal or hard
institutional factor that affects the entrepreneurial activities of firms (Salimath and Cullen,
2010). Furthermore, the effect of regulatory institutional contexts on the internationalisation
process of companies has been widely discussed elsewhere (Bevan, 2004; Aulakh and
Kotabe, 2008; Coeurderoy andMurray, 2008; Kiss and Danis, 2008; Bruton et al., 2009).
In the RE industry, due to the fact that the cost of electricity generated from it is still not
competitive when compared to other more conventional energy sources, clean energies need
to be supported by favourable policy schemes, such as stimulating feed-in-tariff
programmes[1], where there is systemic failure or system imperfection (Negro et al., 2012).
Therefore, development and growth in the RE industry is often highly policy-sensitive and
closely related to political support. However, the effects of the policy in the development of
this industry is rather mixed across countries, as can be seen in in several studies
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2003; Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Lund, 2007; De Laurentis and Cooke,
2008; Bürer and Wüstenhagen, 2009; Reddy et al., 2009; Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006;
Wüstenhagen, Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012) that emphasise the importance of an
effective and favourable policy in the fostering of renewable energies. For instance, in the
wind energy industry, a comparative study of the policy support systems of 12 countries
suggests that a combination of direct (ex. finance and tax incentives) and indirect support
mechanisms (mandatory renewable energy target) is necessary to establish an
internationally competitive industry (Lewis andWiser, 2007).
Governments across the world have also pursued several policies to reach their goals for
the development of renewable energies and the confronting of environmental concerns. In
the European Union, for instance, the 2020 programme forces member countries to increase
their energy production that is derived from RE sources to 20 per cent by the end of 2020.
Germany has designed and implemented advanced RE public policies, such as StrEG[2] and
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG[3]), which are known as feed-in tariff laws. In this
country, years of consistent policy support has been an important driver for the increase of
renewable electricity generation. No other country has been so successful in growing in new
capacity as quickly as Germany, particularly in the wind power sector. Germany accounts
for more than 40 per cent of installed wind power capacity, and nearly 60 per cent of the





A recent study byWüstenhagen andMenichetti (2012) shows that supportive energy policies
that effectively reduce the risk of investment in renewable energies, such as feed-in tariff
programmes, actually help investors in the private sector when making decisions as to where the
adjusted risk-return equation is more favourable for renewable energies. Accordingly, although
feed-in tariff are usually the most expensive public policy choice, it has proven to be the most
effective method, both for investors and end-users in many countries (Bürer and Wüstenhagen,
2009).
Deliberatively supportive and effective domestic policies can also foster RE firms to move
across borders, thus, resulting in the establishment of internationally competitive industries (Lewis
andWiser, 2007). For example, in the wind energy industry, a sizable and stable homemarket can
provide a long-term planning horizon for local providers, to develop more secure future
investments. Furthermore, a more favourable policy at the national level can also push the
outward internationalisation of RE companies. For example, in China, there has been a special
focus on strategic industries – such as RE – since the late 1990s. In addition to this, export-driven
growth policy during the 2000s has made the country a major player in international markets (Liu
and Goldstein, 2013). Success stories of Chinese exporting companies in the photovoltaics and
wind turbines sectors (de la Tour et al., 2011; Liu and Goldstein, 2013) prove that there is a highly
positive impact of effective domestic policies on the internationalisation of local companies. This
supportive policy scheme has driven Chinese companies to proactively seek new international
opportunities based on the highly favourable and dynamic renewal energy homemarket[4].
On the other hand, a supportive RE policy may also create an encouraging domestic context
that can attract foreign investments as international RE firms look for better opportunities in
countries with a better policy support for clean energy sources. An example of this is the case of
Danish wind turbine company (Vesta) internationalising to the USA (Wüstenhagen, 2003; Løvdal
andNeumann, 2011) after a positive policy-level change in the state of California.
In summary, national governments often attempt to balance alternative political goals, which
are related to the increased production of RE with budget limitations, home market economic
activity and the development of new, internationally competitive industries. In the context of rapid
technology development, along with changing support schemes and regulations in different
countries, this creates a dynamic and often hard to predict environment for RE companies.
Therefore, the ability to adjust to unexpected changes in the domestic regulations and support
schemes becomes one of themost critical components forfirms that competewithin the RE sector.
4. Political uncertainty in the Spanish renewable energy context
In Spain, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade would be the one fully responsible for the
implementation and monitoring of the RE policies and regulations at a country-level. In 1980,
prior even to its joining the European Union, Spain passed the first law for energy conservation to
support emerging RE technologies. Since then, and after joining the EU in 1986, Spain has
implemented a variety of policies that support renewable electricity generation. In 2005 and 2010,
the country’s plans to achieve its RE targets and objectives were officially published. The
European Union’s binding law, called the renewable energy directive[5], stated that at least 20 per
cent of total energy would be provided by renewable sources in the EU by 2020, and has also
gradually forced all its member states to support the development of renewable technologies. To
meet this long-term energy objective of EU, Spain followed the corresponding EU directive and
published the National renewable energy action plan (PANER in Spanish) for 2011-2020 that
explained how the country would achieve its RE targets by 2020[6]. These laws gave early and
full priority to renewable sources for grid access, feed-in tariff, and market premium incentives at




The Spanish Government initially established large RE incentive programmes in the country,
particularly since the mid-2000s. Accordingly, most of the RE firms that were established from
the early and mid-2000s were expected to have very attractive demand conditions within their
home market and have the potential to expand on a larger scale domestically. During that time,
one of the most generous incentive programmes for the promotion of solar energy was
established in Spain, and in 2008 it was largest globalmarket for solar power installation.
However, these large incentive programmes were gradually and very significantly reduced in
the following years, mostly due to the negative effects of the financial crisis that began in 2007,
resulting in deep regulatory changes to drastically reduce costs for national budgets. During the
financial crisis, the Spanish Government started reducing its high initial support for renewable
energies sources by gradually reducing feed-in tariffs rates and by the end of 2012, all the
remaining supports had been drastically cut. In 2013, due to a huge tariff deficit of nearly e30bn
that had been accumulated since 2001, the Spanish Government suddenly decided to make
retroactive cuts to the feed-in tariff programme for installed productions and extra taxes were
introduced for generating electricity from RE sources, such as the so-called “sun tax” for
photovoltaics energy self-consumption in 2015. These political decisions caused many local RE
providers to sue the Spanish Government in the international courts over its retroactive decision
to drastically cut the support programmes.
Policymakers’ “attention shift” is another key political challenge pertaining to RE
development in Spain. This phenomenon occurs when the focus of policymakers suddenly
changes from one given technology to another or towards other possible applications over
time. Indeed, the newest trends in energy policy in Spain are currently very supportive of
biomass and energy efficiency technologies, while other types of renewable energies lack
any further support. Furthermore, it should also be noted that RE policy in Spain has been
traditionally designed to mainly support domestic market consumption and that no specific
policy, such as the aforementioned Chinese Government subsidies to solar photovoltaics,
has been developed to heavily support the export activity of domestic RE firms.
Therefore, a key consequence of all these detrimental policy changes regarding RE
production and consumption in the country is a huge reduction of capacity and employment
in the sector, following a drastic reduction of domestic demand for these type of clean energy
sources. According to a recent report published by the Spanish Renewable Energy
Association (APPA, 2017), the development in installed capacity and employment (direct,
indirect and total) in different parts of the renewable energy sector in Spain has decreased
dramatically in the past few years. Including all renewable energy sectors, the number of
employees has fallen from 127,548 in 2011 to 74,566 in 2016. However, large variations exist
between the different types of renewable energy. An example can be seen within the solar
thermoelectric industry, where the total number of employees was 33,555 in 2011, which fell
to 5,216 by 2016 (APPA, 2017, p. 113) – a reduction of 84.5 per cent (Figure 1).
Furthermore, to illustrate the rather negative effects of this political instability and the
uncertainty in the development of renewable energy technologies in Spain, we also show the
recent evolution of the installed renewable energy capacity in the country according to data from
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, 2017) (Figure 2). Due to the drastic
governmental policy reform, which cut all forms of financial support to the renewable energy
sector after the recession period, the stagnating and even declining number of installations in the
country can be clearly observed across the given period of time.
5. Research method: exploratory multiple case study
To understand how and why policy-related factors could affect the internationalisation of





was deemed to be the most efficient for this study. As empirical studies on the
entrepreneurial internationalisation of firms in this emerging renewable energy industry are
still scarce (Løvdal and Neumann, 2011; Bjørgum et al., 2013; Erikson et al., 2015), we
adopted a qualitative method that was capable of gathering rich and in-depth data from
different case units. Moreover, the novelty of the subject, as it was at the intersection of
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Source: *Estudio del Impacto macroeconomics las Energías
Renovables en España (p. 13), by Asociación de Empresas de
Energías Renovables (APPA), December 12 2017, retrieved









Furthermore, the choice of using multiple data sources allows for triangulation, thereby
enhancing the validity of the study (Yin, 2009).
The sample population for the study comprises of entrepreneurial Spanish firms that are
developing international activity in the renewable energy sector. The firms were selected using
purposeful sampling suggestions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). This strategy
involving the selection of firm cases implies maximal variation sampling, thereby enabling the
triangulation of multiple data sources by including different perspectives of the key phenomenon
that is under study, e.g. internationalisation in the Spanish renewable energy sector. Accordingly,
we used a multiple case design that was based upon our key research criteria in the purposeful
selection of relevant firm cases. These criteria included: being a company active in any main
technology within the renewable energy industry; having been founded and/or being legally
registered in Spain; and having developed a certain level of international activity. According to
these selection criteria, we firstly identified over 50 potential companies from the IDAE[7] public
database and sent them a formal invitation to form a part of the research project, with around 15
of them initially becoming interested. To increase the diversity and the heterogeneity of our data,
we ended up choosing nine internationalising companies of different size, all of which were
already established in the Spanish renewable energy industry and at various levels of
technological development. Some key descriptive information about these investigated cases,
such as the firm’s age, size, technology level and first year of international activity, is summarised
inTable I.
We gathered our data from multiple sources to gain in-depth information from each
single case and make a more systematic comparison between the firm cases. Several
potential informants, including eco-entrepreneurs, energy policy authorities and experts
from local institutions supporting renewable energy development in the country, were
chosen and duly contacted due to their potentially diverse perspectives regarding the
conducting of (international) business in the sector.
According to the following interview procedures previously outlined by Eisenhardt (1989),
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Yin, 2009, a total of 18 interviews were conducted with
different internal and external informants. Most were face-to-face interviews that were conducted
with the eco-entrepreneurs of the selected companies (usually the founder, CEO or seniormanager/
s), and the questions were semi-structured regarding their firms’ characteristics and
internationalisation activities. However, several interviews were also conducted with local energy
policymakers and energy experts from ICAEN (Catalan Institute for Energy Policy), ACCIÓ
(CatalanAgency of Business Competitiveness) and Solartys (centre for the international promotion
of renewable energies). The interviews usually lasted between 60 and 100min on average, and
were sometimes held with more than one interviewee at a time. All interviews were conducted
physically in each firm or institution location and/or eventually completed through follow-up calls.
All interviews were fully recorded and transcribed, and a database was created for each firm case.
Altogether, this amounted to more than 20h of recordings, and approximately 230 pages of
transcripts were collected during the period of data collection (2014). After each interview process,
a copy of the transcripts and case reports was sent to the interviewees to check for any possible
error or misunderstanding, and to ensure the validity and reliability of the primary data that were
collected. These data were also triangulated with other multiple sources of evidence, such as
observations or secondary information available from online reports, the websites of the
investigated firms and institutions, news releases and materials provided by the informants (e.g.
company brochures, internal memos, archival data, etc.,). Therefore, the validity of the study was
established based on the key principle of the triangulation of data sources (Yin, 2009).
In our data analysis, especially in the cross-case analysis phase, potential similarities and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Eisenhardt, 1988). We critically explored and compared the timing and motives for the
internationalisation of multiple firm cases based mostly upon their interaction with the
increasingly unstable political environment in the renewable energy sector in the home
country. In particular, the key policy-level effects of the changing renewal energy regulation
in the country and their eventual consequences for the nine selected firms were
investigated at three different stages: pre-policy reform, at policy-reform time and post-
policy reform. In addition, several strategic actions undertaken by these firms to better cope
with this volatile and politically uncertain domestic environment were further identified.
Thus, the whole analysis and extracted facts were guided by the research objectives, and
key analytical dimensions derived from the conceptual background, and the rising themes
that began to emerge from the data seemed to be pertinent for our interpretation. The main
results of the study are presented in the following section.
6. Findings
As mentioned above, a supportive governmental policy in the home market appears to be
essential for the growth and development of competitive and sustainable companies (Lewis
and Wiser, 2007; Lund, 2007; De Laurentis and Cooke, 2008). In the case of the emerging
renewable energy, this seems to be particularly true. Several countries, such as Denmark
and Germany, first started actively supporting this sector by creating internal and strong
industrial clusters in the domestic market. This ultimately helped local firms to foster the
development of these technologies in the international arena.
According to our case-based results, one of the key factors that motivated the
internationalisation of the investigated Spanish firms was the sudden, uncertain and rather
detrimental changes made to the domestic renewable energy policy. In the following paragraphs,
we discuss the effects of an initially supportive renewable energy policy in Spain from the
perspective of the several firm cases we examined, and then show how they had to begin dealing
with an increasingly unfavourable policy regime for renewable energy development at home.
In the mid-2000s, one of the most attractive feed-in tariff programmes for the stimulation of
renewable energy generation (especially solar power) was established in Spain, and it had an
even higher than the feed-in tariff system that existed in Germany, which was curiously high for
a country with much lower sun radiation compared to Spain. As an example, in 2007, the feed-in
tariff for solar technologies in Spain was e46.58 Cent/kWh while it was e33.3 Cent/kWh in
Germany. Thus, over 2,600MWof solar capacity was installed in Spain in 2008, whichwasmuch
higher than the expected 400MW installation (Zhang et al., 2014). Evidence from the firm cases
indicates that most of these companies actually started their business when the domestic policy
regarding renewable energies was extremely favourable and within the country, mostly due to
the very generous feed-in-tariff system in play. For example, Vidurglass was created in 2006 due
to the highly supportive renewable energy regulation in Spain at that time. They noted:
Actually, by then [before subsequent policy change], local RE new and established companies did
not even think of neither need to go abroad because they had a huge and very promising domestic
market (Solartys’ informant).
Indeed, according to TecnoTurbine’s founder, the renewal energy policy framework was
apparently so favourable in Spain that other international companies were attracted and entered
the Spanish market. These included, for instance, E.On and RWE from Germany, Eni from Italy
and other Japanese and Chinese providers. The informant from ACCIÓ also commented on this
“institutional call effect” that promoted foreign competition entry to take advantage of such an
attractive renewable energy policy in the country. This could be seen as an inward





renewable energy sector during that time. However, as an expert from ICAENmentioned, despite
such favourable initial regulation, it was unfortunate that Spanish policymakers never focussed
on truly looking to create a powerful local manufacturing industry that could produce the
equipment required for the emerging power plants, an oversight that has always been considered
one of the main gaps in the development of the renewable energy industry in Spain. Another
informant fromMira Energia expressed a similar concern:
I think the important thing for the country [Spain] was to develop an industrial cluster or
infrastructure [. . .] However, the pace of this [renewable energy sector] growth was so fast [. . .]
and then they [policymakers] suddenly stopped and changed law very fast because the maximum
potential was reached in two or three years [. . .] in three years, you do not have enough time to
develop an entire industrial cluster (Mira Energia).
Therefore, though the supportive renewable energy policy stimulated new local firms to rapidly
enter the sector in Spain, our findings also indicate that some possible trade-offs with regard to
the offering were seen by the public incentives being too high for the stimulation renewable
energy development in the country. This is was what happened in the case of Spain, with the
high feed-in-tariff programme that was offered mostly during the early 2000s until the final years
of the worldwide financial crisis. One key consequence of this programme also involved
attracting other very competitive international firms, thereby limiting the growth opportunities
for emerging local ones, and thus, resulting in a lack of time for creating and developing a truly
competitive homemarket-based cluster in the sector, which would have clearly empowered them.
Secondly, domestic new firms did not actually have many internal incentives to develop an
international orientation from inception, due to the huge demand available in the home market at
that time. Thus, it seems that these high policy-level incentives (feed-in-tariff program) in Spain
not only heavily increased public sector costs but also did not clearly contribute to developing an
internationally competitive renewable energy sector in the country from the onset.
However, as aforementioned above, the lasting consequences of the financial world crisis,
which began in 2007, along with the markedly increased tariff deficit in the Spanish economy
that were largely accumulated since 2001, were the main reasons for the sudden and drastic
change in the renewable energy policy towards a much less supportive regulatory framework in
the country. Accordingly, by mid-2013, the Spanish Government had made very significant
retroactive cuts to the previous feed-in tariff programme and even introduced rather high
additional taxes on generating electricity from renewable energy sources.
Particularly in the past several years, this severe policy reform in the Spanish renewable
energy sector has critically affected most established companies in some manner, regardless
of their size. A company such as Alstom wind, for instance, that had mainly commercialised
wind turbines for the Spanish local market, started following its customers abroad because,
due to the policy reform in Spain, it found that no clear development of the domestic market
could be foreseen in the near future. Another case firm that was widely affected by this
detrimental policy change was Vidurglass, which saw its business drastically reduced from
e1M to 100,000 in a short period of time. Our informant in another firm, Mira Energia,
expressed his concerns regarding the absence of any supporting domestic policy framework
in the Spanish renewable energy sector. He noted that:
[. . .] the big challenges are to overcome the combination of the financial crisis and the unfavorable policy
change in the last past three years. It is the main constrain we have in our country. It is a bad point for
developing the industry cluster and to increase the level of employment here (Mira Energia).
However, while Watly’s founder and CEO also believed that this change and increasingly
uncertain domestic policy environment had negatively affected the level of confidence and




this firm’s management had, as inception, decided to sell their modules to clients in Italy,
North America or other countries, where the renewable energy sector was growing faster.
Thus, this company actually emerged as a truly born-global firm. Another investigated
company that was less affected by the policy reform in Spain was, perhaps, OpenDomo, as
they were not focussed on renewable energy technologies in the mass market, which was
highly dependent on tax policy support.
Under this changing and greatly uncertain post-reform regulatory environment in the Spanish
renewable energy sector, most of our investigated companies had to react and adapt to the new
political context in the sector by compensating for the increasingly declining domestic market by
supplementing it with the international markets. Indeed, their need for long-term survivability
and eventual growth prospects in the future clearly required them to start and extend operations
in other more attractive markets rather than solely at home. Therefore, for most of these firms
international expansion or outward internationalisation (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993) clearly
emerged as the most suitable solution or key strategic reaction, if not the only one, that could
overcome their increased constraints and regulatory-based difficulties in the homemarket.
While Alstom wind’s primary target market at the outset was Spain, they were forced to
enter many other markets abroad during the policy reform. Mira Energia’s founder also
claimed that: “to survive [in] your business, internationalisation is a must nowadays”.
Another firm studied, Energea, had, since its establishment in 2010, mainly focussed on the
installation of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency domestically, but
decided to enter the Chilean market early due to the policy change in Spain, simply because
they could not foresee any future development in the home market:
Now our clients and partners have more activities in Chile than in Spain, it is true [. . .] in Chile,
there are many constructions, buildings [. . .] and demand for energy is high but in Spain all this
kind of projects are stopped [. . .] It is important to continue our work [. . .] if we cannot work in
Spain, we have to go out (Energea).
For Smalle Technologies, a marine energy specialist with a successful patented idea for wave
energy generation, two main crucial factors drove it to enter the international market. The first
was the continued access to very convenient wave conditions in countries such as the UK,
Portugal and the USA, while the other key driving factor for internationalisation was to look for
more favourable public policy support for this particular technology in other countries. The UK,
for instance, was amuchmore suitable location for developingmarine energy technologies:
Yes, there are two main drivers for us; one is going to where the big waves are. We can be
interested in Spain, UK, US, and even Australia [. . .] all focal points to try our devices. And, the
other main reason is how public supports are available for these technologies. For some years
Spain was a really good place to develop our idea, for example in the Canary Islands and in the
north coast of the country. Nowadays, it is difficult for our new projects to get into reality. Some
other countries like the UK have nowadays more context-based advantages (Smalle
Technologies).
Techno turbine developed an innovative idea for the generation of electricity from water
pressure in the pipes. It implemented this business idea in the home country in 2012 and
received important technological support from Siemens. However, the CEO of this start-up
suggested that moving to other countries early, particularly those with more stable legal
frameworks than those Spain, was the only solution for survival in the long-term:
The problem is that RE companies [in Spain] cannot do much about it [the changing regulatory
system]. The solution will be to become international and be present at countries where the
stability of the laws and regulations is higher and the policymakers have a real commitment with





Watly, one of the cases investigated in our sample, clearly emerged as an INV, and had focussed
its business primarily on the international context from inception to avoid being affected by the
latest regulatory changes that were taking place in the Spanish sector. Another informant in a
consulting companywithin this sector, E-consultant, alsomentioned that:
It is obvious that [Spanish companies] have to spread the risk and have to go to other foreign
markets. It would be unreasonable not do so. The construction of renewable energy plants will
always hang on the good will of the politicians in all countries. You have to be present there if you
want to have a piece of the cake! (E-consultant).
As aforementioned above, we also conducted several interviews with energy-related institutions,
such as ICAEN, ACCIÓ (and Solartys (Spanish association for the promotion of renewable
energies). According to our ICAEN informant, due to the crisis and consequential policy change
in Spain, many local companies were considering internationalisation simply because they
needed to survive. Indeed, as the financial crisis began, the percentage of exports that occurred
within the sector has increased annually due to the drastic decrease of the internal demand, with
manymore renewable energy companies trying to export their products and services abroad as it
was deemed to be the only way for them to stay alive. ACCIÓ’s representative also mentioned
that many major players had left the Spanish market and were now active in the main
international markets, while Solartys’ informant agreed that after policy change in Spain, local
RE companies needed to internationalise their activities to better ensure their survival.
Thus, as the drastic policy reform, Spanish firms within the renewable energy industry
are increasingly looking to internationalise to foreign markets, where they can perceive a
more favourable and supportive policy scheme than the one currently in place in Spain.
Accordingly, apart from market size considerations, the need to identify a highly supportive
institutional framework regarding renewable energies in the host country/s would be
considered paramount in terms of foreign market selection.
Energea’s founder highlighted that when evaluating the market/s they wanted to enter, policy
issues were one of the key factors that needed to be assessed. By policy assessment, he was
referring not only to an analysis of the market potential, but also to all technical requirements
needed to enter the market, along with the benefits of public financial incentives that would be
available in the host country (like feed-in tariff support). For example, their highly successful
entry in Brazil managed to take advantage of all the financial incentives available in this foreign
market. Furthermore, Energea had entered the Chilean market due largely to its more favourable
energy policy than the one in Spain. However, they seemed more reluctant to enter other
countries, such as Germany or the USA, as while their home markets for renewable energy are
huge and may offer high economic profits, they policy issues in these two countries had very
strict technical requirements that had to be met. Similarly, there is huge potential for installing
wind energy plants in Argentina, but because of the non-supportive local public policy, Energea
has not beenwilling to enter thismarket thus far.
In Japan, after the Fukushima disaster, the wind energy market began to develop very fast,
and Alstom wind was also willing to enter this culturally distant market due to the huge feed-in
tariff support that was offered by the Japanese Government. Also, to select the best market/s
abroad, Mira Energia’s entrepreneur mentioned that there should be high compatibility between
the entry firm and the policy framework found in the target market. For example, in the USA,
there are some specific regulations (UL[8]) that any firmwould have to follow if it wanted to enter
this huge market. Solartys’ informant also noted the great importance of studying the energy
policy scheme and legal framework present in any potential host country-market, an essential




Well, the solar sector in particular and renewable energy sector in general is really policy-sensitive. So,
there is no much organic growth in terms of internationalization [. . .] You cannot say: Okay, now my
market will be South America and I start with Brazil, and then I go to Mexico, and then I go to Chile [. . .]
You cannot do this. It always depends on the local regulation. It heavily depends on the national laws.
[. . .], this is one of the main reasons for the companies to decide where to go (Solartys).
Table II provides an overview of the most relevant domestic energy policy-level effects that
have taken place in the Spanish renewable energy sector, according to the nine selected
companies and three other related institutions that we examined. The key political effects of
the changing and increasingly uncertain renewal energy regulation in a country and their
consequences for these case firms are presented at three different stages of analysis, namely,
pre-policy reform, during policy reform time and post-policy reform. Furthermore, the main
strategic actions that were undertaken by these firms and institutions to better cope with
this volatile and politically uncertain domestic environment are also illustrated. In all cases,
such strategic (re)actions to better cope with the new regulatory system and declining
market scenario at home generally involved a large increase in internationalisation efforts as
a key path to achieve firm survival and growth. It also shows the importance of the
favourability of the energy policy framework available in the potential host country as a
determining factor in the selection of proper international market/s.
7. Discussion
Both the institutional and entrepreneurship literature usually considers policy as a key
institutional factor that may affect (international) entrepreneurial activities (Bevan, 2004;
Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008; Bruton et al., 2009; Salimath and Cullen, 2010), while some prior
literature has already discussed the effects of the national institutional context on the
entrepreneurial internationalisation of firms (Kiss and Danis, 2008). Our main objective in
this research was, thus, to build on this issue further by addressing, as key research
questions, how and why the drastic renewable energy policy reform in Spain ultimately
influenced the development of international entrepreneurial activities amongst domestic
firms. Our discussion was then focussed on twomain topics.
7.1 The key relevance of context: increased domestic political uncertainty as an institutional
scape driver in the Spanish renewable energy sector
In some countries, renewable energy companies appear to be quite successful at influencing the
development of more helpful policies within the sector. For instance, in Denmark, the major wind
energy companies actively work together with universities in advancing suggestions to
recommend more convenient policy developments, as exemplified in several reports, such as
Megavind (2010). Similarly, WindEurope (formerly EWEA) and the global wind energy council
constantly make relevant policy suggestions. It is also well-known that in more established and
mature energy sectors, such as oil and gas, large key players in the energy industry actively
influence policymaking based upon their huge resources. Furthermore, with established
agriculture and forest-related industries targeting bio-energy as a growth opportunity, it further
reflects how different actors attempt to influence energy policymaking. Therefore, continued
attention to the on-going debates, along with processes resulting in new regulations and policies
in the energy sector, are andwill be extremely crucial.
However, as shown in the aforementioned case of the Spanish renewable energy sector, while
an initial domestic regulatory system based upon large feed-in-tariff incentives made this market
very attractive and quickly resulted in increased investments in the domestic sector, a number of
problems subsequently emerged. Firstly, Spanish renewable energy firms had almost no












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































unexpected changes to home market conditions. Secondly, the establishment of such a generous
policy mechanism also attracted large foreign investors into this sector within the country. This
resulted in fierce competition between both domestic and foreign firms, thereby limiting the time
and possibilities available to the former in building sufficient competitiveness. Finally, the high
cost of these public feed-in-tariff incentives made it impossible to keep them for a long time,
particularly when faced with the challenging consequences of the global financial crisis.
Therefore, while the initially supportive renewable energy policy in Spain actually helped to
achieve a rapid increase in its production that could satisfy internal demand, it failed to develop a
truly competitive industry in both the domestic and internationalmarkets.
The results of this study also show that the subsequent and unexpected policy change
towards a more unfavourable and less supportive regulatory framework regarding renewal
energy development in Spain also negatively affected many companies, regardless of size, that
were operating at home. This was because this policy reform damaged the internal demand and,
as a consequence, led to many local firms not being able to forecast any further development of
the domestic market in the near future. From the case companies’ perspective, such largely
unexpected regulatory changes in the home country usually represent increased political
uncertainty and instability. Indeed, constant and drastic changes in the domestic institutional-
regulatory framework in the form of “stop and go” policies can be found among the key barriers
for the sustained development of renewable energy companies (Negro et al., 2012), ultimately,
discouraging green entrepreneurs and investors from taking the risk needed to develop such
technologies. Besides, a lack of trust in governmental policy not only affects the current
renewable technologies expansion but also their future development.
Following Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) and Cuervo-Cazurra et al.’s (2018) interesting theoretical
frameworks regarding the influence of the home country on the internationalisation of (especially
emerging market) firms, the highly country-specific context of this research clearly showed that
political uncertainty due to the highly changing renewable energy policy in Spain could be
viewed as a key institutional scape driver for the understanding of the relatively early and reactive
internationalisation operations of many domestic firms in this sector. As seen in the previous
section, most of the founding entrepreneurs and/or key managers of our firm cases appeared to
have decided to move operations to institutionally more stable countries abroad to avoid the
higher level of political uncertainty in the home country’s sector. No clear evidence, however,
seems to emerge from our cross case analysis regarding the other possible mechanism of
institutional learning, as decision-makers in our sampling case firms did not actually appear to
have developed any special learning process nor specific ability that could be useful for the
management of a higher degree of political diversity that might be found in countries, due to their
dealingswith high political uncertainty and instability in the home sector.
Indeed, the theoretical arguments above are essentially borrowed from the recent research on
emerging markets multinationals (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) that usually move towards more
advanced and politically stable economies. However, in this research, we have also demonstrated,
at least partly, the potential validity and extension of this research for the particular case of a
highly developed Western economy such as Spain, but interestingly, also a country with high
political uncertainty in the emerging renewable energy sector over time.
7.2 Early and reactive internationalisation as a survival-seeking strategy for Spanish
renewable energy firms
This paper has also discussed the conceptual framework section regarding the key
differences between the gradual internationalisation process/Uppsala model and the more
recent INV/born-global theory in regard to the earliness of initial foreign entry after





consequences for firm long-term survival and eventually growth. Accordingly, there are
several reasons to believe that internationalisation from venture inception that is either too
early or too late could lead to a higher risk of failure versus the managerial capacity for a
given firm to identify an optimal time to internationalise.
Due to both the increased foreign competition in the home market and the high level of
domestic institutional-political uncertainty in the Spanish renewable energy sector, most of
our investigated case companies that were created in Spain at or during the drastic reform in
domestic energy policy can be considered as early internationalising firms. This is because
they vary from none to a maximum of four years in difference between venture inception
and first foreign market entry. Therefore, they all rapidly reacted to the increasingly
uncertain market conditions following post-energy policy reform in the declining domestic
market of origin by extending their operations soon after inception towards other more
institutionally attractive foreign country-markets than those found at home[9]. They did so
as a sort of “institutional scape strategy” that was aimed at ensuring their long-term
survival and/or eventually future growth, and mostly to overcome their increased
constraints and regulatory-based difficulties in the home market. Thus, although this
unexpected policy change was largely detrimental for internal renewable energy market
development, entrepreneurial internationalisation has, perhaps, become the most viable
solution for many Spanish renewable energy companies that need to survive.
Furthermore, inmany of our case interviewswith entrepreneurs-managers and sector experts,
several respondents underlined the importance of finding more supportive regulations and
incentives abroad when discussing foreign market selection. In fact, a more favourable and
continuously supportive energy policy in other countries can encourage renewable energy firms
to look for better opportunities in those foreign markets (Wüstenhagen, 2003; Løvdal and
Neumann, 2011). Løvdal and Neumann (2011) demonstrated that one of the main reasons for the
internationalisation of companies in the marine energy sector is to be able to count on a highly
favourable political scheme (including adequate regulations, concession laws, access to grid, price
subsidies and several other institutional issues). Unfortunately, Spanish policymakers have, thus,
far failed to develop an effective regulatory mechanism in the renewable energy sector.
Furthermore, no specific policy has ever been developed to support the international growth of
Spanish renewable energy companies. A lack of this kind of policy is, perhaps, one of the main
challenges affecting this sector in Spain.
Based on all the above-mentioned evidence obtained from the investigated firm cases, it can
be generally concluded that when compared to the largely uncertain regulatory system for
renewable energy development in Spain (especially after the global financial crisis), more
supportive policy frameworks are eventually available in several other foreign markets globally.
Thus, ignoring the considerations based upon psychic and/or cultural distance logic in terms of
foreign market selection, as posited by traditional approaches, it seems that careful institutional
environment assessments abroad have a crucial impact for many of these firms in their decision
to go international, and in particular, where to do so in the global renewable energy market.
Therefore, broadly speaking, our cross-case results derived from early internationalising Spanish
renewable energyfirms tend to fit the notions derivedmostly from the IE approach (Cavusgil and
Knight, 2009). However, their international success may also critically depend on their continued
capacity to learn and adapt a wider geographical focus and coverage to other different energy
regulatory systems and demand conditions elsewhere.
8. Conclusion, implications and final remarks
In this empirical study, we have primarily examined how unexpected regulatory changes at the




companies. These companies typically lack the relevant size, and therefore, the capacity to
influence – by means of lobbying – the development of a more favourable energy policy
framework at home. Thus, it was only through their reactive and early internationalisation efforts
that they were able to survive and eventually prosper in more institutionally stable environments
than at home.
In our opinion, this study makes several academic contributions in this emerging research
field. Firstly, from a theoretical standpoint, our paper complements previous research primarily
on firm-specific factors that enhance internationalising firms’ survival and growth (Autio et al.,
2000; Sapienza et al., 2006; Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; Carr et al., 2010; Meschi et al., 2017; Patel
et al., 2018) through a focus on the impact of a changing institutional-political environment at the
home country-level, something which is largely out of the control of firms (Peng, 2001). In
particular, we have focussed on examining the relevance of the domestic political environment in
the activity and development of renewable energy companies by reflecting on how a higher
degree of political uncertainty, due to constant regulatory changes at home, may indeed act as a
key “institutional scape driver” (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). This ultimately encourages early
and reactive internationalisation among local firms to ensure survival. Secondly, from an
empirical contextualising perspective, our paper provides rich and unique context-specific
evidence of the unstable political environment regarding renewable energy in Spain over a period
of time, and its key impact upon the sector development in this country. In particular, based on a
multiple case study design, we have analysed how a certain number of Spanish renewable energy
firms had to react to the increasingly hostile energy policy regulations at home, along with a
corresponding decline in the local market demand, by means of entering other more
institutionally attractive renewable energymarkets abroad relatively early in their life cycle.
Our research also offers relevant implications at managerial and policymaking levels. From a
managerial perspective, two important implications for renewable energy emerge from this study
for practitioners. The first reveals the risk of focusing only on the home market, as it can be too
dependent on uncontrolled variations in domestic energy policy. Second, the ability to make an
early re-focus and adapt to the attractiveness of different countries is another important element
within the renewable energy sector. In addition, businesses operating in this emerging sector
should also be aware that the impact of a policy reform can be different based on the degree of the
technology maturity. As renewable energy technology becomes more mature, it seems to be
somewhat less policy-dependent. Evidence collected from some of our cases show that companies
in the wind energy industry, for instance, usually tend to be less affected by policy-level changes
in comparison with those competing within solar energy. This is simply because wind energy is
already a slightly more mature technology than the solar variant, and its development does not
depend asmuch onfinancial incentives and stronger policy support.
In terms of public policymaking, the findings indicate that a more stable and supportive,
long-term perspective in the domestic renewable energy policy is essential for the sustained
growth and development of this emerging industry. Many countries, such as Denmark and
Germany, first started supporting the development of local companies in renewable energy
sources within the country and then, after a strong industrial cluster had been created at home,
fostered the development of these technologies in the international context. Furthermore, as
aforementioned, supportive renewable energy policy in some countries has adapted to
providing important incentives for promoting increased export and internationalisation of
domestic firms, such as in the case of both the wind and photovoltaic sectors in China (de la
Tour et al., 2011; Liu and Goldstein, 2013). Thus, continued policy support appears to be
absolutely necessary for the global development of this green industry. However, our results
clearly indicate the rather negative long-term effects of feed-in-tariff programmes that are too





placed by policymakers in the sustainable development of the renewable energy industry. Such
uncertain “stop and go” policies and unexpected “attention shift” practices by policymakers in
charge of domestic energy policy, such as the ones observed in the case of Spain, could, thus,
become the main institutional barriers for the sustainable development and expansion of these
green technologies (Negro et al., 2012). This is because they ultimately generate a lack of trust
in the local government and discourage entrepreneurs and investors from taking the risk of
developing these new technologies further.
Looking at our results from a broader, critical perspective, they strongly suggest that it will be
really difficult for not highly developed nations to achieve dominant industrial positions in the
new, renewable energy sectors. These new industries require governmental support and
incentives in their early phases. Bjørgum et al. (2013) describe how wave and tidal energy
companies enter different countries to access key resources. These companies are, thus, part of a
global development process in which companies may originate in one given location, while
conducting research and development (R&D) activities in another, and then helm piloting and
demonstrations tests in a third country, before finally performing energy production and/or sales
in other countries. Even though the firms enter new geographical markets and relocate activity-
based on the available support schemes, a limited number of countries have the resources to fund
the early development years of such new industries. We have described how Spain reduced
economic incentives due to budget restrictions caused by the financial crisis. Germany and China
have developed dominant international positions in the new, renewable energy sectors, based on
sustained policy support and incentives. In the mature renewable energy sector of hydropower,
we note how the USA based AES Corporation invests in countries exemplified by Vietnam,
Jordan and El Salvador, while Norwegian Statkaft has production facilities in Albania, Nepal and
a number of other countries. The broader effect of the importance of economic support
mechanisms in the development of new, renewable energy industries is a systematic advantage
for developed countries compared to less developed countries when it comes to building
competence and competitiveness.
Finally, our study is not free of some limitations that, in turn, could reveal interesting future
research directions.While the potential benefits of conducting highly contextualised case-based
research are being used by several IB-oriented researchers (Welch et al., 2011), our research is
undoubtedly limited and highly country-specific, due to our main focus of examining the
Spanish renewable energy context. Other countries’ domestic energy policy, such as Norway’s
for instance, are more focussed on stimulating technology R&D within the domestic firms
operating in this sector, but do not directly subsidise them to develop new types of renewable
energy. Therefore, further quantitative and qualitative research should focus more on
examining the crucial importance of the domestic institutional context in other countries for a
better understanding of the industrial development and internationalisation within the global
renewable energy sector. In addition, more in-depth case studies focussed on understanding
how companies can better adapt themselves to the huge fluctuation and cross-country
differences observable in public energy policy are needed. Finally, considerably more
knowledge is required as to how new internationalisation processes currently being developed
by renewable energy firms are becoming increasingly embedded within global value chains in
this emerging sector.
Notes
1. Feed-in-tariff is an obligation for uses to purchase at a set price, with the electricity being
generated by any renewable energy resource. The level of tariff and its design characteristics




2. “Feed-in Law” in Germany.
3. “Renewable Energy Act” in Germany.
4. Chinese Governmental subsidies have provided a significant manufacturing cost advantage to
Chinese producers, which includes more than just offsetting higher shipping costs (Goodrich,
James, and Woodhouse, 2011). In 2012, during the imposition of a new set of tariffs, the US
Department of Commerce concluded that Chinese solar photovoltaics exporters have received
subsidies ranging from 2.90 to 4.74 per cent (International Trade Administration, 2012).
5. (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive).
6. (www.mincotur.gob.es/energia/desarrollo/EnergiaRenovable/Paginas/paner.aspx).
7. The Institute for Diversification and Saving of Energy, IDAE, is a part of Ministry of Industry,
Energy and Tourism of Spain.
8. Underwriters Laboratories (UL), is a company that provide safety certificate for technological
products. For exporting products to the US, having a UL safety certificate is compulsory.
9. However, only one case firm in our sample, Watly, can be considered to be a truly born-global firm, as
this firm’s management had, as inception, decided to start selling their modules only to international
clients that were located in foreign countries where the RE sector was growing faster.
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